Realistic models of contests between animals will often involve a series of state-dependent decisions by the contestants. Computation of evolutionarily stable strategies for such statedependent dynamic games are usually based on damped iterations of the best response map. Typically this map is discontinuous so that iterations may not converge and even if they do converge it may not be clear if the limiting strategy is a Nash equilibrium. We present a general computational technique based on errors in decision making that removes these computational difficulties. We show that the computational technique works for a simple example (the Hawk-Dove game) where an analytic solution is known, and prove general results about the technique for more complex games. It is also argued that there is biological justification for inclusion of the types of errors we have introduced.
Introduction
Frequency-dependent effects are ubiquitous in the natural world. To understand the action of natural selection in such circumstances, a game theoretic approach is required. The end point of the evolutionary process is an evolutionarily stable strategy or ESS (Maynard Smith 1982 , Hammerstein 1996 , Weissing 1996 . Early game-theoretical models were usually highly schematic in that they considered a single decision by the contestants. Realistic models will often require the investigation of a series of state-dependent decisions by each contestant. A problem with such models is that they are difficult to analyze. In particular, the ESS usually has to be found by computation. The techniques used have not always yielded an ESS (e.g. , Crowley & Hooper 1994 , Holmgren & Hedenström 1995 , Lucas & Howard 1995 , Lucas et al. 1996 and then it is not clear whether there is an ESS that might be found by other methods or whether no ESS exists. For example it is not clear which of these alternatives apply in the work of Lucas et al. (1996) . The computational techniques used are based on finding the best response for a mutant in a resident population. Problems arise because the best response does not vary continuously with the behaviour of the resident population, i.e. the best response map is discontinuous.
In this paper we describe a computational technique for finding ESSs. It is based on the assumptions that there are errors in the decisions made by an animal, but that the probability of an error decreases as its cost (in terms of reproductive success) increases.
Once errors have been introduced, a suitably defined best response map is continuous. As we show, this smoothing of the best response map obviates many of the problems associated with computing ESSs. We argue that in addition to its computational advantages, the assumption of errors is also biologically realistic.
Computational Problems
An ESS analysis for a large population can be split into two components.
The environment. The strategies adopted by members of the population together with the physical environment determine the environment experienced by population members.
Best mutant. Given an environment we can consider the fitness of all possible "mutant" strategies within this environment. A strategy maximising fitness will be referred to as a best mutant strategy. For some environments there is a unique best mutant, for others there is a set of best mutants with all members of this set doing equally well.
Given these components we may define the best response map, B, as follows. Suppose almost all population members use strategy π. This resident strategy creates an environment. Let B(π) be the set of all best mutant strategies within this environment. We will call a strategy in B(π) a best response to π. When there is a unique best response to π we will, with a slight abuse of notation, denote the best response by B(π). A necessary condition for a strategy π * to be an ESS is that it is a Nash equilibrium; i.e. π * is a best response to itself:
Computations typically seek to find a solution to equation (1), and it is this computational problem we will focus on here. Since conditions for evolutionary stability are stronger than the Nash equilibrium conditions, having found a solution to (1) one must then further investigate the stability of the solution.
The Hawk-Dove Game. Concepts and computational problems are illustrated using the following standard example of the Hawk-Dove game Price 1973, Maynard Smith 1982) . The Hawk-Dove game can be solved analytically, but we can used this simple game to illustrate problems which occur when attempting to compute Nash equilibria for more complex games where an analytic solution is not possible.
Two animals contest a resource of value V . Each must decide whether to be aggressive (i.e play "Hawk") or display, (i.e play "Dove"). Each animal makes its choice before it knows the choice of its opponent. If a Hawk meets a Dove the Hawk wins the resource.
If two Doves meet, they share the resource. If two Hawks meet each wins the resource with probability 1 2
. The loser pays cost C, representing the cost of injury (we assume 0 < V < C).
For the Hawk-Dove game a strategy is specified by a number π, where 0 ≤ π ≤ 1. Under strategy π, an animal plays Dove with probability 1−π and plays Hawk with probability π.
Let W (π , π) be the payoff to a mutant strategy π when the resident population strategy is π. Then
This payoff is an increasing function of π when V − πC > 0 and a decreasing function when V − πC < 0. Thus the best response map is given by
B(π) is the set of all strategies when π = V C (4)
From equation (3) -(5) it can be seen that the strategy π * = V /C is the unique strategy satisfying condition (1). It can easily be verified that π * also satisfies the stronger condition of Maynard Smith (1982) .
Although the Hawk-Dove game can be solved analytically, complex games usually need to be solved by numerical computation. Typically, numerical methods employ an interative scheme which generates a sequence of strategies π 0 , π 1 , π 2 , . . .. Hopefully this sequence converges to a solution, π * , of equation (1). The simplest scheme is as follows.
Iteration of the best response map. Take any strategy as the initial strategy π 0 . Set
, set π 2 = B(π 1 ), and so on. In this way one obtains a sequence π 0 , π 1 , π 2 , . . . of strategies where each strategy is the best response to the previous strategy in the sequence.
The sequence obtained by the above scheme may converge to a strategy π * which is the best response to itself and so satisfies equation (1); and this method has been successfully used to find the solution of a dynamic game (Houston and McNamara, 1988) . Often, however, the sequence π 0 , π 1 , π 2 , . . . fails to converge at all.
To illustrate failure of convergence consider the Hawk-Dove game. Suppose that the initial choice of strategy π 0 satisfies π 0 < V /C. Then by equations (3) and (5) π 1 = B(π 0 ) = 1, π 2 = B(π 1 ) = 0, π 3 = B(π 2 ) = 1, etc. The sequence obtained is thus π 0 , 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, . . ..
Similarly if π 0 > V /C the sequence is π 0 , 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, . . .. Thus the sequence π 0 , π 1 , π 2 , never converges unless one has been fortunate enough to choose π 0 exactly equal to V /C.
One can attempt to stop the sequence of strategies π 0 , π 1 , π 2 , . . ., from oscillating by modifying the above iterative scheme as follows.
Best response with damping. Let λ lie in the range 0 < λ ≤ 1. Construct the sequence π 0 , π 1 , π 2 , . . . by taking π n to be the randomised strategy which chooses strategy π n−1 with probability 1 − λ and strategy B(π n−1 ) with probability λ. With this interpretation we write
The previous scheme is obtained by setting λ = 1.
We can give a loose interpretation of this iterative scheme by supposing that we are really following the evolution of a population and that π n is the resident population strategy in generation n. Equation (6) then says that generation n is formed from generation n − 1 by replacing a proportion λ of the population in generation n − 1 by individuals whose behavioural strategy was the fittest mutant strategy in generation n − 1. When λ = 1 there is a complete replacement of the population in each generation, and not surprisingly the evolutionary process can oscillate. Replacing only a small fraction of the population tends to stabilise the evolutionary process.
Computations of some complex games (e.g. Houston & McNamara 1988 , Lucas & Howard 1995 , Lucas et al. 1996 illustrate cases in which the sequence π 0 , π 1 , π 2 , . . . oscillates for λ = 1 but converges to a solution π * of equation (1) for λ sufficiently small. It is easy, however, to find examples for which the scheme (6) fails to work no matter how small a value of λ is used. The Hawk-Dove game provides such an example. For the Hawk-Dove game the sequence π 0 , π 1 , π 2 , . . . of strategies fails to converge for all but a countable non-generic set of π 0 (Appendix 1). Table 1 illustrates this effect.
An obvious modification of the scheme (6) allows λ to depend on n.
Best response with increased damping. Let
where the sequence λ 0 , λ 1 , λ 2 , . . . satisfies λ n > λ n+1 and λ n → 0 as n → ∞.
Applying this scheme to the Hawk-Dove game always produces a sequence π 0 , π 1 , π 2 , . . .
of strategies which converges (Appendix 1). If the sequence of λ n 's tends to zero too rapidly the limit of the sequence of strategies may not be the ESS strategy π * = V /C (Table 1) . This is because excessive damping does not allow the population to "evolve". In particular it is shown in Appendix 1 that if
then there is no initial π 0 such that π n → V /C for all possible V /C. Conversely provided the λ n 's tend to zero slowly enough so that
the sequence π 0 , π 1 , π 2 , . . . of strategies will converge to the ESS strategy π * = V /C whatever the π 0 chosen and whatever the value of V /C. (Appendix 1).
Although the numerical scheme (7) works for the Hawk-Dove game when condition (9) holds, there are problems with using it as a general method. First, even if π n tends to π * as n tends to infinity, convergence is liable to be very slow. This is because condition (9) means that λ n tends to zero very slowly as n tends to infinity. Table 2 illustrates convergence of π n to π * in the Hawk-Dove game when λ n = n −1 . As can be seen, even after 1000 iterations |π n − π * | is still of the order of 5 × 10 −4 .
A second drawback of the scheme given by (7) is that there is no reason to suppose that the scheme works for complex problems. The Hawk-Dove game is rather special in that the set of possible strategies is the one-dimensional interval [0, 1] . For complex games the set of possible strategies is typically a subset of R n for large n, and the analytic argument, valid for the Hawk-Dove game and presented in Appendix 1, is not applicable.
Thirdly, if a sequence π 0 , π 1 , π 2 , . . . of strategies is calculated, how do we recognise the sequence is converging to a limit? Of course, since in finite time one can only compute a finite number of strategies to some prescribed limit of accuracy, one never knows. It seems to be a reasonable working practice to assume that convergence is occurring when, say, there is a θ < 1 such that
apears to be true for all sufficiently large n. (Here |π n − π n−1 | is some appropriate measure of the distance between strategies π n and π n−1 ). Although this criterion is usually satisfied when a scheme with constant λ converges, when there is increased damping and the damping used satisfies condition (9) |π n − π n−1 | will typically tend to zero too slowly for (10) to hold. It is then much more difficult to decide whether the sequence π 0 , π 1 , π 2 , . . . is really converging.
The final difficulty may arise with any scheme in which a sequence π 0 , π 1 , π 2 , . . . of strategies is calculated. Suppose that a numerical calculation yields a sequence which appears to be converging. If we accept that the sequence really is converging to a limiting strategy π * , how do we know that π * satisfies equation (1)? It may be that the scheme employed forces convergence, as with Table 1 . We might have confidence that the limit π * satisfies π * = B(π * ) if the calculation also suggests that
as n → ∞. But for many games the best response map is discontinuous at the ESS so that we would not expect condition (11) to hold even when π * = B(π * ). The Hawk-Dove game illustrates this point. Table 2 shows a case in which the sequence {π n } converges to the ESS strategy π * = V /C, but the sequence {B(π n )} does not converge. For the Hawk-Dove game analytic arguments tell us that the ESS is V /C. If we did not have these analytic arguments but only had the numerical results in Table 2 , then even if we were prepared to accept that {π n } was converging, we would not know from Table 2 that the limit π * satisfied equation (1).
Introducing Errors into Decision Making
We now introduce errors into the choice of action made by contestants in a game. We will do so in such a way that the probability of costly errors is small, while the probabilities of errors with virtually no cost is large. The resulting "best response with error" turns out to be a much better behaved function than the corresponding best response function without error. Consequently, many of the computational problems described in the previous section disappear.
In this section we will restrict attention to the case where contestants make a single choice of action and all contestants are in the same state. Games in which contestants make sequences of state dependent choices are discussed later.
Consider a game in which contestants make a choice between the K actions a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a K .
A strategy, π, for this game is a vector
, where p i (π) is the probability that action a i is chosen under π. We assume a large population, and refer to a strategy as the resident population strategy if almost all population members adopt this strategy.
Suppose the resident population strategy is π. Let W i (π) denote the expected reproductive value of an individual which chooses action a i within this population. Under an optimal choice of action the expected reproductive value is then
For each i let
Then C i (π) = 0 if the choice of action a i is optimal and C i (π) > 0 if the choice of action a i is suboptimal. The quantity C i (π) is a measure of the loss in reproductive value as a result of choosing action a i , and is referred to by McNamara and Houston (1986) as the canonical cost of action a i .
To introduce errors let H 1 be a function of a non-negative real variable which satisfies
H 1 (x) is continuous and strictly decreasing in x (15)
For some applications it is also necessary to ensure that H 1 is sufficiently smooth by imposing a condition such as
Let the resident population strategy be π. Then we can assign weight
to the choice of action i within this population. Let
Then the best response, B 1 (π), to π with error function H 1 is defined to be the strategy which chooses action i with probabilityp i (π); i.e.
Under strategy B 1 (π) there is a positive probability of choosing each action. The optimal action is chosen with the highest probability and action a i is more likely to be chosen than action a j if the canonical cost of choosing a i is less than the canonical cost of choosing a j . As the canonical cost of choosing an action increases the probability that action is chosen decreases and tends to zero as the cost tends to infinity.
To control the amount of error for given canonical costs we introduce a parameter δ where δ > 0. Define the function H δ by
For example if H 1 (x) = e −x , then H δ (x) = e −x/δ . Then we can use H δ rather than H 1 to generate errors. By setting β
obtain the best response with error function H δ given by
For given canonical costs the probability of error declines as δ decreases. In particular if an action a i has positive canonical cost, then the probability this action is chosen tends to zero as δ tends to zero.
For given δ the best response with error function H δ has two especially useful properties.
Property 1. B δ (π) is uniquely defined for each strategy π.
This contrasts with the best response without error, when there may be many best responses to a strategy π.
To obtain the second property we assume that the payoffs W i (π) are continuous functions of π for each i. This is likely to be true for any reasonable game. Assuming it does hold we have
Again this contrasts with the best response without error, which may be discontinuous, particularly at an ESS.
We define the ESS with error function H δ to be a strategy π * δ which satisfies
that is, π * δ is the best response to itself with error function H δ . The continuity of B δ (Property 2) allows us to deduce two general properties of π * δ .
Property 3. There is always at least one solution to equation (20).
Property 4. Let π n be a sequence of strategies which converge to some limiting strategy,
Suppose that in a game without error a sequence of iterates π 0 , π 1 , π 2 , . . . is calculated.
Suppose also that the sequence appears to be converging. We noted previously that, assuming the sequence is converging, it is difficult to know whether convergence is to an ESS. The main problem is that, even if π 0 , π 1 , π 2 , . . . is converging to an ESS π * , the sequence of best responses B(π 0 ), B(π 1 ), B(π 2 ), . . . may not converge, or may converge to a limit other than π * . Property 4 shows that these difficulties disappear when attempting to calculate an ESS with error, since criterion (21) gives a necessary and sufficient condition that convergence is to the correct limit.
Other properties of an ESS with error may depend on the specific nature of the game under consideration. For any particular game one would like to know what iterative schemes are liable to work in finding π * δ , and would like to know which of the ESS's without error are limits, as δ tends to 0, of ESS's with error. In this paper we do not attempt a general analysis of these issues, but look at them in detail in the Hawk-Dove game.
The Hawk-Dove Game with Error
When each contestant must choose between just one of two actions as in the Hawk-Dove game, the formulae of the previous section can be re-expressed in a different form. We present this new form, indicate how it is related to the previous definitions, and then use the new form to analyse decision errors in the Hawk-Dove game.
We begin by defining a class, {G δ }, of error functions. Let G 1 be a function of a real variable which satisfies:
G 1 is continuous and strictly increasing.
(and hence G 1 (0) = 1 2 ).
Now for each δ in the range 0 < δ ≤ 1 define the error function G δ by
As δ decreases, the function G δ becomes more step like (Figure 1 ).
as δ → 0, where by G 0 we mean the function
Now suppose that there are just two actions, a 1 and a 2 , to choose from in a game. A strategy is thus defined by a pair of numbers π = (p 1 , p 2 ). However, since p 1 + p 2 = 1 we can define a strategy by a single number π where π is the probability of choosing action a 2 .
As before let W i (π) be the expected reproductive value of an individual which plays action i when the resident population strategy is π. In the absence of errors the best mutant response to resident population strategy π is to choose action a 2 with probability 0 when W 2 (π) − W 1 (π) < 0 and choose action a 2 with probability 1 when W 2 (π) − W 1 (π) > 0. In other words the best mutant response is to choose action a 2 with probability
where the function G 0 is given by equation (28). Now let G δ be an error function as defined above. Motivated by formula (29) we define the best response to π with error function G δ to be the strategy under which action a 2 is chosen with probability
An ESS with error function G δ is then a strategy π * δ satisfying
Although we have chosen to define the best response with error here in a seemingly different way to its definition in the last section, it is not difficult to show that the two definitions agree provided the functions G 1 and H 1 are related by
with G 1 (x) for x < 0 being given by condition (24). For example when H 1 (x) = e −x we have
To introduce errors into the Hawk-Dove game we can equate "play Dove" with action a 1 and "play Hawk" with action a 2 . By equation (2) we then have
so that if the resident population plays Hawk with probability π the best response with error function G δ is to play Hawk with probability
Unlike the best response in the standard Hawk-Dove game, the best response with error is a uniquely defined strategy. Under this strategy errors are made, but the probability of error decreases with the fitness cost of the error and tends to zero as the fitness cost increases. For a given fitness cost, the probability of error decreases as δ decreases, and tends to zero as δ → 0. Figure 2 shows the best response with error as a function of the resident population strategy π.
For the Hawk-Dove game it is easy to show that, for given function G δ , equation (31) has a unique solution (Appendix 2). Thus there is a unique ESS with error for each function G δ . For given G δ one can show that: and the ESS without error, π * = V /C.
One might hope that as the probability of error decreases, the ESS with error tends to the ESS without error. In Appendix 2 it is shown that this is indeed the case: Figure 3 shows the dependence of π * δ on δ for two different initial error functions G 1 .
In the Hawk-Dove game without error the best response, B(π), is a discontinuous function of the resident population strategy, π. As we have seen, the jump discontinuity at π = V /C leads to problems when attempting to compute the ESS by numerical schemes based on iteration of the best response map. When there is error, the best response B δ (π) is a continuous function of π for all π. Consequently, in computing π * δ almost all the previous problems disappear. Let the sequence of strategies π 0 , π 1 , π 2 , . . . be given by
(cf. equation (6)). Here, as before, the replacement factor λ satisfies 0 < λ ≤ 1. It can then be shown (Appendix 2) that
provided that
Thus, unlike the case without error, the iterative scheme with a fixed level of damping works provided that there is sufficient damping. As inequality (42) shows, the level of damping required depends on the amount of error. When the probability of error decreases (δ decreases) the amount of damping required increases (the replacement factor λ decreases).
Finally, suppose an iterative scheme is employed in an attempt to calculate π * δ . Suppose the scheme generates the sequence of strategies π 0 , π 1 , π 2 , . . . . Then it can be shown that this sequence converges to π * δ if and only if condition (21) holds (Appendix 2). This is a stronger result than the general result given in Property 4 as we do not demand that the sequence π 0 , π 1 , π 2 , . . . is already known to be converging.
State-dependent Dynamic Games
Many realistic game-theoretic models of animal behaviour consider animals that make repeated interactions whose consequences for an animal depends on its state. For example, consider the behaviour of a small bird in winter that has to engage in contests with other birds in order to gain access to food. During a winter's day, a bird will typically be involved in many contests. In each contest, the bird has to decide on its level of aggression. In this context, a strategy is a rule that specifies how a bird's level of aggression depends on its energetic reserves and time. Given a resident population strategy, we can determine the best response for a mutant bird. To do so, however, we cannot start by considering contests in isolation from one another. This is because the value to the mutant of winning a contest and hence obtaining food will depend on the amount of food that it is likely to obtain in the future. This future food will depend on both the mutant's behaviour and the behaviour of other members of the population. At a given time in the future, the level of aggression
shown by other population members will depend on both the population strategy at that time (which specifies how aggression depends on reserves) and on reserves at this time, which depend on the behaviour of all population members prior to this time. An example in which each contest over food is modelled as a Hawk-Dove game is analyzed by Houston & McNamara (1988) and McNamara et al. (1991) .
This dependence of the best current action on both the behaviour of the focal individual in the future and of the resident's behaviour at past and future times occurs in many games of biological interest. Examples include information exchange during extended contests (Enquist & Leimar, 1983 , 1987 , Leimar & Enquist (1984 , calling to attract mates (Houston & McNamara 1977 , Lucas & Howard 1995 , Lucas et al. 1996 and growth and cannibalism (Crowley & Hopper 1994) . We now present a general model that applies to all of these cases, and provide a framework for introducing errors in such games.
The Model
We model behaviour over a finite time interval with decision epochs t = 0, 1, 2, . . . , T − 1. For each fixed t the set of possible states, E(t), of an organism is finite. For each fixed time t and state x the set of available actions, A(x, t), is finite. A strategy, π, is a Markov rule for choosing actions as a function of state and time. This rule may be probabilistic, so that for each state, x, and time, t, π specifies the probability,
Suppose that the resident strategy is π and consider a single individual in this population following a possibly different strategy. Suppose this individual chooses action a i at time t when in state x. Then the individual obtains an immediate contribution r i (x, t; π)
to its reproductive success, and is in state y at time t + 1 with probability γ i (x, y, t; π). If the individual is in state x T at final time T its reproductive value is R(x T ; π). The total payoff to the individual is the expected sum of the immediate contributions to reproductive success at times t = 0, 1, 2, . . . , T − 1 and the final reproductive value at time T .
The best response with error
We introduce errors in decision making into this game by assuming that an organism has a probability of making an error in every state and at every time. As before, the probability of making an error depends on the cost of the error. Costs are, however, dependent on future expectations and hence dependent on errors in decision making in the future. We thus find the best response with error by working backwards as in dynamic programming.
Take an error function H δ given by equations (19) and (14) - (17). Let π be a resident population strategy. The best response, B δ (π), to π with error function H δ is defined inductively by working backwards from final time T . Suppose that behaviour under B δ (π) has already been found for every state at times t + 1, t + 2, . . . , T − 1. An individual which uses strategy B δ (π) from time t + 1 onwards has reproductive value W (y, t + 1; π) at time t + 1, where y is its state at this time. Now focus on an individual in state x at time t. If this individual chooses action a i at this time and then uses strategy B δ (π) from time t + 1 onwards its reproductive value is
here the sum is over all possible states y at time t + 1. Set
(cf. equation (12) and set
(cf. equation (13)). Then we can assign a weight
to the choice of action a i . Strategy B δ (π) prescribes that this focal individual chooses action a i at time t with probabilitŷ
(cf. equation 18). The reproductive value of this individual is thus
Equations (43) - (48) define W at time t in terms of W at time t + 1. Since
we can find W (x, t; π) for all states x and all times t by backward induction. Equation (47) then specifies the action chosen under B δ (π) for every state and time.
Properties of the best response function
Let B δ , defined by equation (47) above, be the best response function for our general state-dependent dynamic game. Property 1, that B δ (π) is uniquely defined for each strategy π, follows directly from equations (43) - (49) If we have found a convergent sequence of strategies π n , which converges to some limiting strategy π ∞ , then Property 4 enables us to check easily whether or not π ∞ provides a Nash equilibrium. We do not address the problem of finding such a convergent sequence for the general state-dependent dynamic game in this paper.
An example: Brood desertion.
We illustrate the model with an example based on brood desertion. In some species, if the brood receive no care they are likely to die, whereas the extra advantage of biparental care over uniparental care may be small. Under these circumstances, it might be worthwhile for a parent to desert in order to try to mate and obtain another brood. The best decision for one parent clearly depends on the behaviour of that parent's partner. It also depends on how easy it is to get further mates and on future desertion decisions. The probability of future matings depends on the number of males and females looking for mates, which in turn depends on the previous desertion decisions of all population members.
Szekely et al. (unpub) present a particular model of desertion that is relevant to birds.
Females differ in terms of the clutch size that they lay. Once a clutch is laid both the male and the female must decide whether to care for the brood or desert. For each sex a strategy specifies how the desertion decision depends on clutch size and time during the breeding season. For some parameter values, the iteration scheme based on a best response with a fixed level of damping fails to converge whatever the level of damping. This occurs because optimal desertion decisions depend discontinuously on the sex ratio amongst birds looking for mates, so that the best response map is discontinuous. Introducing errors into decision making in the manner explained above, smoothes the best response map so that the iterative scheme now converges provided there is sufficient damping. As with the HawkDove game the level of damping required decreases as the probability of error increases as is shown in Figure 4 . The figure also shows that when the replacement factor λ is small (high damping) convergence is slow even when it occurs.
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Previous analyses of dynamic games in a biological context have typically used some damped iteration of the best response map in the search for Nash equilibria. This technique has not always been successful (e.g. , Crowley & Hopper 1994 , Holmgren & Hedenström 1995 , Lucas & Howard 1995 , Lucas et al. 1996 . The difficulties that we experienced in our attempt to find equilibria in dynamic models of desertion led us to develop the computational technique based on errors that is presented here. The technique is very general and applicable to any game. Introducing errors in the way that we describe will eliminate discontinuities in the best response map.
Another advantage is that errors should obviate difficulties that arise from representing state variables on a discrete grid. Using the technique in desertion games, we have always been able to find equilibria. The technique has also been useful in other games (Johnstone, 1997 , Henson pers. comm., Lucas pers. comm.).
Although we have introduced the idea of errors in decision-making as a computational tool for finding ESSs, there is an alternative, biological, justification for their use. It is clearly unreasonable to expect animals to behave in exactly the way predicted by the simple models used in behavioural ecology. In the context of prey choice, models typically predict that a prey type is either always accepted or always rejected (i.e. choice is all-ornone), whereas the data show that under given conditions, a prey type may be sometimes accepted and sometimes rejected, i.e. animals show partial preferences . There is, however, a pattern to the deviations from the predictions of optimisation models -costly deviations tend to be rare (see Houston, 1987 for a review of some examples). It is precisely this aspect of real behaviour which is captured by our procedure.
Economists have introduced errors into games not as a computational tool but to eliminate Nash equilibria which are thought to be unrealistic (see, for example, Fundenberg & Tirole 1991). In particular the definition of a proper Nash equilibrium (Myerson, 1978 ) is based on a similar concept to our ESS with error. Biological games may also have Nash equilibria which are unrealistic in that they disappear when errors are introduced. Errors have been used in biology to stabilise or otherwise resolve situations where drift may erode neutrally stable solutions (cf. Parker & Rubenstein, 1981; Hammerstein & Parker, 1982) .
Thus given that animals make errors, our technique is both computationally useful and ensures that the predicted outcomes are biologically realistic.
Appendix 1. Iterative Scheme for the Hawk-Dove Game
We consider the scheme
where π * = V /C. Three cases are analysed.
Case I. λ n constant. Let λ n = λ where 0 < λ ≤ 1. Let A ⊆ [0, 1] be the set of π 0 for which π n = π * for some n. Note that by equations (A1.1) -(A1.3), for any π n there are at most three values of π n−1 which give rise to this π n . Thus there are at most 3 n initial points π 0 such that π n = π * . It follows that the set A is countable.
Conversely, suppose π n−1 > π * . Then by equation (A1.3)
By inequalities (A1.4) and (A1.5)
Thus if π 0 / ∈ A, inequality (A1.6) holds for all n and the sequence π 0 , π 1 , π 2 , . . . does not converge.
Case II. λ n ↓ 0, Σλ n = ∞. We first show that there is a sequence n 0 < n 1 < n 2 < · · · such that for even k
and for odd k
To see this suppose that for some n we have π n > π * . Then if π n+1 , π n+2 , . . . , π n+r > π *
we have since Σλ m is divergent. Thus since π * > 0 there would be an s such that π n+s ≤ π * a contradiction. It follows that π n+s ≤ π * for some s. This shows that given n k with π n k ≥ π * there exists n k+1 > n k such that (A1.7) holds. Construction of the sequence (A1.8) is similar. It can then be seen that if n 0 is the first value of n for which π n ≥ π * one can construct the whole sequence by induction on k.
Applying this to the sequence satisfying conditions (A1.7) and (A1.8) shows that for k ≥ 1 we have
Case III. λ n ↓ 0, Σλ n < ∞. We first show that the sequence {π n } is convergent. If
Thus |π n−1 − π n | ≤ λ n for all n. Now let η > 0 be given. Since
λ n is convergent we can choose an N such that
This shows that {π n } is a Cauchy sequence in [0, 1] . Since [0, 1] is closed the sequence is convergent.
We now show that, given any π 0 there is a range of values for π * (depending on π 0 ) such that the sequence {π n } converges to a limit which is not equal to π
Since Σλ n is convergent, it is easy to show that 1 ≥ α > 0. Suppose
Then, since π * < α 2 by equation (A1.3) we have
Thus π n ≥ α/2 for all n. Since π * < α 2 π n does not converge to π * .
Similarly if π 0 ≤ 1 2 then limit (35), (26) and (23) Thus there is a unique π such that b(π) = 0: i.e. B(π) = π.
Results (37) and (38) follow similarly.
Theorem A2.2
For given G 1 there exists > 0 such that
Proof. Choose such that
. Then G 1 ( ) = 1 − V /C and hence G 1 (− ) = V /C by equation (24). Letπ satisfy V −πC = −2 δ. Then π ≥π implies that V − πC ≤ −2 δ and hence
Since π 
Suppose λ satisfies
for all strategies π 1 and π 2 .
Proof. Without loss of generality suppose 0 ≤ π 1 < π 2 ≤ 1. Then
by conditions (23) and (26). Thus by (A2.6) and (A2.7)
Thus 1 − λ − Cλ/2δ ≥ λ − 1. Inequality (A2.5) then follows from this and inequality (A2.8).
By Theorem A2.3, h is a contraction mapping provided inequality (A2.4) holds. Since the fixed point of h is the fixed point, π δ , of B δ , it follows that the sequence π 0 , π 1 , π 2 , . . .
of strategy given by condition (40) satisfies condition (41) provided that inequality (42) holds.
Theorem A2.4
Let {π n } be a sequence of strategies. Then
To prove the converse, let π be any strategy.
From inequalities (A2.8) and (A2.9)
Appendix 3
For a given resident strategy π, let φ(x, t; π) denote the probability a randomly selected member of the resident population is in state x at time t. We assume that the initial frequency distribution is given by φ(x, 0; π) = q(x) and is independent of π. Let φ t (π) denote the vector with components φ(x, t; π), x ∈ E(t), and let p t (π) denote the matrix with components p i (x, t; π), x ∈ E(t), i ∈ A(x, t).
Throughout this appendix, B δ denotes the function defined by equation (47). For each fixed x and t, let ∆(x, t) denote the simplex ∆(x, t) = {(p 1 , . . . , p K(x,t) ) : 0 ≤ p j ≤ 1 for j = 1, . . . , K(x, t) and Σ K(x,t) j=1 p j = 1}, where K(x, t) denotes the number of possible actions in A(x, t). Let ∆(t) denote the Cartesian product over x ∈ E(t) of the sets ∆(x, t) and let ∆ denote the Cartesian product over t ∈ {0, 1, . . . , T − 1} of the sets ∆(t). Note that ∆ is a compact, convex subset of R M , where M = Σ t,x K(x, t).
A strategy π is defined in terms of the probabilities p i (x, t; π), so each strategy π corresponds to a unique point in ∆. The rule specified by π for choosing the action at time t is defined in terms of the matrix p t (π), and each p t (π) corresponds to a unique point in ∆(t). We define the distance between two strategies π and π by taking π − π = maximum t,x,i |p i (x, t; π) − p i (x, t; π )| and the corresponding distance between two rules p t (π) and p t (π ) by
Similarly, let Γ(t) denote the simplex corresponding to distributions on E(t), so each vector φ t (π) corresponds to a unique point in Γ(t). Again the distance between two vectors φ t (π) and φ t (π ) is defined by
Continuity of functions on ∆ and ∆(t) × Γ(t) is defined in the usual way. In particular, for two strategies π and π we have
where thep i 's are given by equation (47) . Since the maximum is over a finite number of terms, B δ (π) is a continuous function of π ifp i (x, t; π) is a continuous function of π for each fixed t, x and i.
Theorem A3.1.
For each fixed t, x, y and i, consider r i (x, t; π), R(x; π) and γ i (x, y, t; π) as functions of the resident strategy π. Let F denote the set of all these functions, for t ∈ {0, 1, . . . , T − 1}, x ∈ E(t), y ∈ E(t + 1) and i ∈ A(x, t). Alternatively consider each r i (x, t; π) to be a function r i (x, t; φ t (π), p t (π)) and similarly for the other functions in F .
(B) If each function in F is a continuous function of (φ t , p t ) then B δ (π) is a continuous function of π.
Proof (i) Assume (A) holds, then R(x; π) is a continuous function of π for each x ∈ E(T ) and hence W (x, T ; π) is a continuous function of π. Now assume W (x, s; π) is a continuous function of π for each s = t + 1, . . . , T and x ∈ E(s). From equations (44) - (48) and the standard properties of continuous functions and the positivity of the denominator in equation (47), we have thatp i (x, t; π) and W (x, t; π) are continuous in π for each x ∈ E(t) and i ∈ A(x, t). Proceeding by induction, we have thatp i (x, t; π)
is a continuous function of π for each t, x and i. Hence B δ (π) is a continuous function of π.
(ii) Assume (B) holds, so each function in F is a continuous function of (φ t , p t ). Continuity of B δ in π will then follow from assumption (A) if both φ t (π) and p t (π) are continuous functions of π. The continuity of p t (π) follows from its definition, so we only need to show that φ t (π) is continuous in π for each t ∈ {0, 1, . . . , T }.
The initial frequency distribution of the resident population is given by φ(x, 0; π) = q(x), independent of π, so φ 0 (π) is continuous in π. Now assume that φ t (π) is continuous in π for some t ∈ {0, . . . , T − 1}. Then for each y ∈ E(t + 1), φ(y, t + 1; π) = x i φ(x, t; π)p i (x, t; π)γ i (x, y, t; π) so φ(y, t + 1; π) is continuous in π, and hence φ t+1 (π) is continuous in π. Hence, by induction, φ t (π) is continuous in π for each t ∈ {0, 1, . . . , T }. Theorem A3.4
Let π n be a sequence of strategies which converge to some limiting strategy, π ∞ , and assume B δ (π) is a continuous function of π. Then π ∞ satisfies B δ (π ∞ ) = π ∞ if and only if π n − B δ (π n ) → 0 as n → ∞.
Proof
(i) Assume π n − B δ (π n ) → 0 as n → ∞. Now π ∞ − B δ (π ∞ ) ≤ π ∞ − π n + π n − B δ (π n ) + B δ (π n ) − B δ (π ∞ ) . As n → ∞ the first term tends to zero since π n → π ∞ , the second term tends to zero by assumption and the third tends to zero by continuity of B δ . Hence we must have π ∞ − B δ (π ∞ ) = 0, so π ∞ = B δ (π ∞ ).
(ii) Assume π ∞ = B δ (π ∞ ), then π n − B δ (π n ) ≤ π n − π ∞ + B δ (π ∞ ) − B δ (π n ) . As n → ∞, the first term tends to zero since π n → π ∞ , and the second term tends to zero by continuity. sequence π n = (1 − λ n )π n−1 + λ n B(π n−1 ) fails to converge for λ n fixed. With λ n decreasing such that condition (8) holds, the sequence π 0 , π 1 , π 2 , . . . converges to π * for π 0 = 0 but not for π 0 = 1. Table 1 λ n = 0.1 λ n = 1/n 2 n π n π n π n 0 0.000000 0.000000 1.000000 Table 2 . Iterative solution of the Hawk-Dove game with λ n decreasing such that condition (9) holds. In this case the sequence π n = (1 − λ n )π n−1 + λ n B(π n−1 ) converges to π * for all π 0 . However, the convergence is very slow, and the sequence of best responses need not converge. The Table illustrates the case π * = 1/ √ 2 0.707107. Table 2 λ n = 1/n n π n π n − π * 
